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1 Introduction
It has been traditionally thought that there is a con‡ict between competition
and patent laws almost by de…nition. The thinking is so widespread that it
has become fashionable to deny such con‡ict.1 The apparent tension arises
from the goals of the laws. Patent laws aim at nurturing innovation by grant-
ing an exclusive property right over an invention. In contrast, competition
laws recognize the ine¢ciency of exclusive rights and guard consumer wel-
fare by promoting competition. Over the past decades courts have become
increasingly tolerant towards the privileges of patent holders, but the con‡ict
continues to surface in many prominent antitrust cases such as Microsoft.2 In
this study we support the notion of downgrading the con‡ict. But, whereas
on-going debate aims at …nding the proper balance between competition and
patent laws, we argue that there is no con‡ict on a deeper level. Antitrust
authorities seldom accept exclusive rights, but they are especially hostile at-
titude towards cartels. We demonstrate that the patent system may make
collusion among innovative …rms more di¢cult, if not impossible.
Our …nding emerges from two properties of the patent system. First,
when a …rm holding an unpatented innovation deviates from the collusion,
the best deviation is to patent. In addition to the usual increase in instan-
taneous pro…ts in the period of deviation, patenting generates a stream of
1Cf., e.g., "Competition and patents are not inherently in con‡ict. Patent and antitrust
law are actually complementary... (Federal Trade Commission, 2003, p.2.)" and "Nor does
it imply that there is an inherent con‡ict between intellectual property rights and the
Community competition rules. (European Commission, 2004, p. C101/2)".
2See Kortum and Lerner (1999) and Rahnasto (2003) for descriptions of how the balance
between competition and intellectal property laws has varied over time. Rahnasto (2003)
also reviews numerous court cases centered around the issue.
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future pro…ts, since the patent, by design, provides protection against re-
taliation by the former collusion members. In this sense the patent system
works like a leniency program in cartel cases where a cartel member can get
an immunity or a signi…cant reduction of penalties if it discloses the cartel.
Second, because the deviator and other former collusion members also com-
pete on an equal footing for patents over future innovations, the deviator
can obtain positive pro…ts in the retaliation phase. Thus, collusions where
…rms hold unpatented innovations are hard, if not impossible, to maintain.
The second property of the patent system guarantees that the introduction
of patents in an industry would make deviation more attractive, even if the
…rms colluded with patented innovations.
Our analysis yields straightforward policy recommendations. Expanding
the patent strength and its subject matter breaks down collusions and yields
a welfare improvement. Abolishing the prior-user rights in the patent systems
also restricts the scope for collusive behavior. For a similar reason, a shift
from the …rst-to-invent rule to the …rst-to-…le rule without prior-user rights
is desirable. Furthermore, because the …rms may improve their ability to
collude by …ling joint patent applications, cross-licensing and pooling patents,
such practices warrant surveillance by antitrust authorities.
Our model builds on the simultaneous model of innovation where agents
…nd ideas according to an urn-ball process. Kultti, Takalo and Toikka (2005)
show that when innovation is simultaneous, patenting can dominate over se-
crecy as an appropriation strategy even if the patent protection is weak: if
a …rm does not patent, someone else might do it and thereby exclude the
…rm from using the innovation. Such simultaneous model of innovation es-
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pecially seems to characterize innovation-intensive network industries where
standardization forces the …rms to work with the same basic technology or
components (Rahnasto, 2003, and Varian, Farrell and Shapiro, 2004). In this
study we continue to view innovation as potentially simultaneous because it
renders our argument transparent. Besides adopting the simultaneous model
to the analysis of collusion, we extend it by allowing for arbitrary, poten-
tially small, number of ideas and innovators. It turns out that the numbers
of ideas and innovators have complex but nonetheless unambiguous e¤ects on
the ability to collude: supporting collusion becomes easier when the number
of ideas grows or the number of potential innovators diminishes.
Although almost all studies on the patent system implicitly deal with
the boundary of competition and patent laws, until recently only few have
addressed it explicitly. This literature usually focuses on speci…c questions
such as whether a collusion between …rst and second generation innovations
should be allowed or not (e.g., Scotchmer and Green, 1995, Chang, 1995,
Denicolò, 2002), or what kind of licensing deals, patent pools or settlements
of patent disputes antitrust authorities should tolerate, (e.g., Shapiro, 2001,
2003, Lerner and Tirole, 2004, Maurer and Scotchmer, 2006). Carlton and
Gertner (2003) take a broad view in arguing that the failure to recognize
the tension between competition and patent laws can lead to errors in the
adoption of traditional antitrust analysis to innovative industries where com-
petition is dynamic.
In extensive legal literature patent and antitrust laws have often been
considered di¤erent means of promoting the same goal, consumer welfare.3.
3A part of the literature is surveyed in Rahnasto (2003). Maurer and Scotchmer (2006)
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Nonetheless, even the supporters of such a positive view acknowledge that
some tension remains between the two laws and point out the need to …nd a
proper balance between them. We tackle the patent-antitrust con‡ict from
a slightly di¤erent angle. As far as we know, we are the …rst to uncover the
advantage of the patent system in hampering collusion.
Our study also relates to the extensive economics literature on tacit col-
lusion, summarized by Ivaldi, Jullien, Seabright, Rey and Tirole (2003). Fol-
lowing Fershtman and Muller (1986), we focus on a semicollusive industry
where …rms can only collude in pricing and behave non-cooperatively in their
innovation and patenting decisions. Collusion in other dimensions beyond
pricing requires more coordination and is more laborious to implement. The
semicollusion assumption is also shared by Fershtman and Pakes (2000) who
show how investments a¤ect collusion possibilities and vice versa. In our
model, dynamic competition over future innovations has an important im-
pact on the ability to sustain collusion both with and without patents. Be-
cause innovation is repeated, deviators can obtain positive pro…ts despite the
optimal retaliation. The pro…t opportunities in the retaliation phase are gen-
erally improved by the introduction of patents. This property of the patent
system is strenuous to eliminate by manipulating the patent system in an
anticompetitive manner. That is, although the innovating …rms could raise
the cost of retaliation in the market where deviation occurs, e.g., by means of
joint patenting or cross-licensing, it would be much harder to do so in future,
unknown markets.
We present a simple duopoly example in the next section. The example
provide a nice overview of the main issues.
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shows the …rst part of our argument, which applies to one innovation stage in
isolation. To allow the feedback from dynamic innovation to collusion possi-
bilities, we generalize the model in sections 3-4. Besides dynamic innovation,
this richer environment incorporates an arbitrary number of ideas and …rms,
knowledge spillovers, multimarket contact and the possibility of innovations
to become obsolete. Patent policy is introduced in section 5. In section 6 we
touch upon the e¤ects of patents on the incentive to innovate and consumer
surplus, and discuss some welfare implications. We also discuss about ro-
bustness of our …ndings and possible extensions of the model. We conclude
with presenting some testable hypothesis in section 7.
2 An Example
Before going to the full model, we illuminate our basic argument in a stan-
dard in…nitely repeated version of the Bertrand duopoly. There are two …rms
that have come up with the same innovation. The …rms compete in Bertrand
fashion which implies zero pro…ts for each of them, unless the …rms can sus-
tain tacit collusion where they share monopoly pro…ts ¼ on the equilibrium
path. If either of them deviates, they reverse to stage game Nash equilibrium
thereafter. With Bertrand-competition this constitutes the optimal punish-
ment strategy (Abreu, 1988).
Let us …rst consider an industry where patenting is infeasible. If the …rms
collude, they equally split the monopoly pro…ts each earning a pro…t of ¼=2
per period. Denoting the discount factor by ±, the discounted sum of pro…ts
from collusion is given by ¼
2(1¡±) . By deviating from collusion a …rm can
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reap the monopoly pro…ts in the period of deviation. As the pro…ts in the
punishment stage are zero, the collusion can be sustained if ¼




In this example we introduce patent policy in a textbook manner: If a
…rm obtains a patent on an innovation, it receives a temporary monopoly
over it, say, for T periods. After the patent expires, the innovation is in
public domain and the other …rm can use it for free. Thus, if one of the …rms
patents, it receives a pro…t of
¼(1¡±T )
1¡± and the other …rm gets nothing. If they
apply for a patent, both …rms have an equal probability of 1=2 of receiving
the patent and the associated pro…ts:
Patent policy does not a¤ect payo¤s from collusion but it crucially a¤ects
the payo¤s in the case of a deviation. As the patent also provides temporary
protection, the best deviation is to patent the innovation. Now the collusion
can be sustained if ¼
2(1¡±) ¸
¼(1¡±T )
1¡± or if ±
T ¸ 1
2
. Thus, if the patent is
in force longer than one period, the patent system makes it more di¢cult
to sustain collusion. The reason is simple: the patent not only provides
temporary protection against infringement but also against the punishment
by the former collusion partner. Moreover, patenting is a strictly dominant
strategy when ±T < 1
2
.
An assumption underlying our argument above is that the duopolists can
make similar innovations and keep them secret. In the next section we model
such innovation process explicitly. We also allow for repeated innovation,




The economy is of an in…nite horizon and proceeds in discrete time. There
are A agents who innovate and each of whom has the same discount factor
±. There are also I ideas or potential innovations, and the agents contact
them randomly. Following O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) we
distinguish ideas from innovations: only ideas that are found constitute in-
novations. This innovation process is just the urn-ball model familiar from
the literature on random matching (see Butters, 1977, for the seminal work).
Because the number of agents is A and the number of ideas I, the number






. In other words, an agent always …nds an idea but there may be
other agents who …nd the same idea. From the point of view of any single
agent, the probability that there are exactly k other agents who …nd the













Until section 6 we view the con‡ict between antitrust and patent laws
from the antitrust perspective. So for the moment we abstract from the
issues related to the incentives to innovate and patent policy by assuming
that innovation is costless.
We assume that an innovator can keep the innovation secret with prob-
ability ®. With probability 1 ¡ ® the secret leaks out and the innovation
becomes public; this is the spillover e¤ect. If the innovation becomes public,
there is free entry to its utilization, which drives production to the competi-
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tive level. To make steady state analysis viable we assume that innovations
become obsolete with probability 1 ¡ ¸. Probabilities ® and ¸ remain the
same each period; one could as well think that they realized only once. We
focus on a steady state equilibrium where the stock of innovations is the same
from one period to another.
The timing of events within a period is the following: First the agents …nd
ideas, then the new innovations become either public or remain proprietary,
then the agents consume and pro…ts accrue to those who possess innovations,
and …nally the innovations (both new and old) either become obsolete or
remain economically viable. Changing the timing of events does not a¤ect
our …ndings. Nor is the possibility of simultaneous innovation a feature that
drives the results. The model would work in a similar way if the agents could
…nd the same innovation that was made earlier by some other agent but this
would be harder to analyze.
We postulate that to each innovation corresponds a demand function that
generates a monopoly pro…t ¼ when the monopoly price is charged. We can
also think that ¼ re‡ects the value of innovations: the larger is the market
generated by an innovation, the larger is ¼. The monopoly naturally emerges
if only one innovator …nds an idea and can keep it secret. When many
innovators come up with an idea we assume that competition is of Bertrand-
type so that the innovators charge the competitive price, driving the pro…ts
to zero. If the innovators collude and charge the monopoly price, they share
the pro…t equally.
Collusion in our model can only take place in pricing. Collusive behavior
in additional dimensions, e.g., in the search of ideas and patenting, requires
8
more extensive coordination and is hence more demanding to obtain. In
section 6.2 we discuss the sensitivity of our results with respect to this semi-
collusion assumption. The analysis of collusive pricing follows the standard
repeated-game treatment. We evaluate a trigger strategy pro…le where each
innovator charges the monopoly price as long as all other innovators did so
in the past. If one or more players deviate, the innovators reverse to the
stage-game equilibrium strategy charging the competitive price forever after.
4 Collusion without Patent Policy
We want to determine when collusion can be sustained in an industry where
patent protection is unavailable. Without loss of generality we focus on an
innovator who has no previous innovations. Deviating from collusion yields
a one period monopoly pro…t but zero after that. 4
Evaluated in the beginning of a period, the expected life-time utility of
an innovator who has no innovations and who colludes whenever she comes
up with an innovation is determined by







+ ¸±U (k) + (1¡ ¸) ±V
¸
; (2)
where - (k) is the probability that exactly k other innovators …nd the same
4If the innovator had n other innovations he would, of course, deviate from collusion in
all markets simultaneously and the immediate pro…t would be roughly n-fold compared to
the case of an innovator with no innovations. The future loss would also be approximately
be n-fold. Although this is not quite accurate since the pro…tability of deviation depends
on the number of colluding partners, it is evident that considering an innovator with n
previous innovations would complicate the analysis without adding insights.
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idea, as de…ned by (1), and where
U (k) = V +
®¼
(k + 1) (1¡ ®¸±) (3)
is the innovator’s expected utility when she has one innovation with k other
colluding innovators.
The …rst term on the right-hand side of (2) comes from the possibility
that the new innovation immediately becomes public. This occurs with prob-
ability 1¡®, and then the innovator gets V next period. The second term is
composed of the expected pro…ts when the new innovation stays proprietary.
The innovator’s pro…t share depends on the number of the other innovators
who …nd the same idea: with probability - (k), k 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g other innova-
tors …nd the idea and each innovator makes pro…ts ¼=(k+1). Note that when
k is zero, there is no collusion, because the innovator is the sole producer in
the market. With probability ¸ the new innovation remains useful, and the
innovator’s utility in the subsequent period is given by (3). With probability

















be the expected pro…t share from collusion, which is decreasing in the number
of innovators (A) and increasing in the number of ideas (I). Then, after
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inserting (3) and (4) into (2) and using (3) again, (2) can be simpli…ed to
V =
¾®¼
(1¡ ±)(1¡ ®¸±) : (5)
Equation (5) shows that the model behaves nicely. The return on collusive
innovation is inversely related to the spillover rate (1¡®) and the obsolescence
rate (1¡ ¸), but directly related to the size of the market generated by the
innovation (¼), the discount factor (±) and the expected pro…t share from
collusion (¾) (which in turn is a decreasing function of A and an increasing
function of I by (4)).
We next calculate the expected life-time utility of an innovator who de-
cides to deviate from collusion. Because the innovators are using trigger
strategies, the deviating innovator earns maximum pro…t, ¼, during the pe-
riod of deviation but receives zero thereafter, except when she manages to
…nd an innovation alone. We apply the one-stage deviation principle, and
consider the deviation only when the deviator …nds the innovation with some
…xed number n of other agents.
The expected life-time utility of a deviating innovator is then given by











¼ + ±V D ¡ ¼
n+ 1
¡ ¸±U (n)¡ (1¡ ¸) ±V
¸
where eV and V D denote the utilities of the deviating innovator and of an
innovator who deviated in the previous period. The …rst term on the right-
hand side of (6) captures the possibility that the innovation immediately
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becomes public in which case the deviation decision is inconsequential. The
second term is the expected utility from collusion if the innovation does not
become public. Here also the case of n other agents is included, but since
in this case the innovator deviates, it is subtracted in the third term that
re‡ects the payo¤ from deviation. There the …rst term in the square brackets
is the immediate utility from deviation and the second is the expected utility
after deviation.
The utility of the innovator who deviated in the previous period is given
by
V D = ®- (0)
¡
¼ + ¸±V D1 + (1¡ ¸)±V D
¢
+ (1¡ ®- (0)) ±V D: (7)
Since the punishment renders the market where the deviation occurred com-
petitive, the deviator’s only chance to get positive pro…ts is to …nd a new
idea alone. Therefore in (7)




gives the expected utility of an agent who has deviated and who is the sole
innovator exactly in one market. In (7) the …rst term on the right-hand side






there are no other innovators. With probability ® the
new innovation remains secret, and the deviator receives monopoly pro…ts.
With probability ¸ the innovation remains useful, and the deviator’s utility
in the subsequent period is given by (8). With probability 1¡ ¸ the new
innovation becomes obsolete and the deviator is again without pro…table
innovations. The second term is the expected utility when either someone else
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…nds the same idea or when the new innovation immediately becomes public.




1 ¡ - (0) = 1¡ ¡1¡ 1
I
¢A¡1
, the deviator will be punished, eliminating the
pro…ts from her new innovation.
Substituting (8) for V D1 in (7) and simplifying yields
V D =
®- (0)¼
(1¡ ±) (1¡ ®¸±) : (9)
Then, after using (2) and involved algebra, the utility of the deviating inno-
vator (6) can be rewritten as
eV = V + ®- (n) ·¼ ¡ ¼
(n+ 1) (1¡ ®¸±) ¡ ±
¡
V ¡ V D¢¸ : (10)
Collusion can be sustained as an equilibrium when V ¸ eV or, equivalently,
when the term in the brackets in (10) is negative, i.e., when
¼ ¡ ¼
(n+ 1) (1¡ ±®¸) ¡ ±
¡
V ¡ V D¢ · 0: (11)
The …rst two terms on the left-hand side capture the gain from the deviation
in the market where the deviation occurs, i.e., the di¤erence between the
monopoly pro…ts from the period of deviation and the forgone pro…t stream
from collusion. These are the usual tradeo¤s that a¤ect the sustainability
of collusion. In our model, however, there is a third term that re‡ects the
expected loss from the deviation in other markets in subsequent periods. In
contrast to many other repeated-game treatments of collusion, the deviating
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innovator can obtain positive pro…ts in the punishment phase. Nevertheless,
comparing (5) and (9) shows that the punishment is real in the sense that
V > V D for A > 1.
Inserting (5) and (9) into (11) gives
1¡ 1






(I +A ¡ 1)
(1¡ ±) (1¡ ±®¸)A · 0: (12)
The temptation to deviate is the greatest when n = A ¡ 1, since then an
innovator’s share of the collusive pro…ts is the least. This case then gives
a conservative lower bound on the discount factor above which collusion is








(I +A ¡ 1)
1¡ ±
#
¸ A ¡ 1. (13)
Condition (13) con…rms the usual …ndings concerning the sustainability of
collusion. On the one hand, it is evident that when ± approaches zero, col-
lusion cannot be sustained. On the other hand, when ± approaches unity
the left-hand side becomes greater than the right-hand side. Because the
left-hand side is an increasing function of ±, there exist a threshold for the
discount factor, ±, such that for all ± ¸ ± collusion can be sustained.
By totally di¤erentiating (13) with respect to ±, ®, ¸, A, and I we obtain:
Proposition 1 The threshold level of the discount factor that makes collu-
sion possible in all markets is increasing in the level of knowledge spillovers,
the obsolescence rate and in the number of innovators. It is decreasing in the
number of ideas.
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The e¤ects of ® and ¸ are similar to the e¤ect of ±: these three parame-
ters constitute the ‘e¤ective’ discount factor. When spillover or obsolescence
rates are high, colluding innovators realize that their pro…ts from the inno-
vation do not necessarily last long, which makes deviation more attractive.
Hence, sustaining collusion should be di¢cult in innovative industries with
appropriability problems.5 The e¤ects of the numbers of innovators (A) and
ideas (I) are more diverse. It is pragmatic to distinguish between the e¤ects
in the ‘deviation market’ (the two …rst terms on the left-hand side of (11))
from the e¤ects in all ‘future markets’ (the third term in (11)). As usually,
collusion is more di¢cult with more competitors in the deviation market,
since both the short-run gains from deviation are larger and the long-run
bene…ts from collusion smaller. The long-run e¤ect of A applies to the fu-
ture markets, too. However, there is also a counterbalancing e¤ect in the
future markets, because the larger the number of innovators, the smaller the
probability of innovating alone. This dilutes the pro…t opportunities in the
punishment phase, raising the cost of retaliation. Proposition 1 shows that
the e¤ects enhancing the incentive to cheat dominate. The number of ideas
has no impact on the deviation market, but it has two opposite e¤ects on
the cost of retaliation in the future markets. As the number of ideas grows,
it becomes easier to …nd one alone in the punishment phase. But the pro…t
share from collusion is increasing in I (see( 4)), which makes the punishment
harsher. The net e¤ect is an increased cost of retaliation.
5Ivaldi et al. (2003), too, predict that collusion is more di¢cult in innovative industries
but do not discuss approbriability.
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5 Collusion with Patent Policy
Patent policy involves many dimensions such as patent length, breadth,
strength and height whose e¤ects have been extensively studied. Because
our main objective is to show that patent policy intrinsically makes collu-
sive behavior more di¢cult, we introduce patents in a simple but general
way: following Ayres and Klemperer (1999), we view patents as probabilistic
property rights. We assume that the patent strength, denoted by ®p 2 (0; 1];
determines the probability that a patent holder can exclude rivals from using
the patented invention. With probability 1¡®p the patent is found invalid or
it can be infringed by others, driving the pro…ts from the invention to zero.
In our model the patent strength is a perfect substitute to the patent length,
measured by the number of periods a patent is in force, in the sense that
whatever policies can be achieved by using one variable can also be achieved
by the other. We choose to work with the strength, which is in practice more
relevant variable than the length; for instance, vast majority of patents is
voluntarily cancelled before the statutory term has passed, and a substantial
proportion of litigated patents is found invalid. We also maintain the purpose
of patent law of awarding only one patent on the same invention. Hence po-
tential antitrust problems stemming from mutually blocking patents cannot
arise in our model. In section 6.2, we discuss in more detail the possibility
to collude on patented innovations.
The expected life-time utility in collusion is the same as before, i.e., it is
given by (5). The utility of a deviating agent di¤ers, however, since the best
deviation is to patent and to get the protection against retaliation provided
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by the patent.6 Since the patent protection is typically imperfect (®p < 1),
the deviator encounters a tradeo¤ between getting protection and allowing
the innovation to become public. Moreover, the worst punishment by other
innovators is to begin patenting. In other words, before the deviation the
industry is in collusion where no patents are employed but the deviation
triggers patenting. If multiple agents make the same innovation, the patent
holder is randomly selected among them and the others receive nothing.
When all the innovations are patented, there is only one producer in each
market.
Let us denote the innovator’s payo¤ if she decides to deviate and patent
when she …nds an innovation with n other innovators by











¼ + (1¡ ¸)±V Dp + ¸±V Dp1 ¡
¼
n+ 1
¡ ¸±U (n)¡ (1¡ ¸)±V
¸
where V Dp denotes the deviator’s expected utility when her patent becomes
obsolete and V Dp1 when it remains useful. The interpretation of (14) is similar
to that of (6). The main di¤erence is that the expected utility after deviation
is split into two terms, ±(1¡ ¸)V Dp and V Dp1 . The split is due to the protec-
tion conferred by the patent against punishment. Provided that the patent
remains useful, the deviator can enjoy pro…ts in the market where she has
6Note that the optimal deviation, even without patents, takes place immediately after
innovators come up with the same invention. With patents it would also be harder to
deviate in subsequent periods for legal reasons. For example, in the US the inventor who
has practiced the invention more than a year is in principle barred from patenting the
innovation. In Europe the right to a patent once the invention is practiced is lost even
faster.
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deviated also in the subsequent period. As in the case of no patent policy
(8), V Dp1 can be expressed as a function of V
D
p :





The deviator’s expected utility in the case where her patent becomes obsolete
is given by






¼ + ¸±V Dp1 + (1¡ ¸) ±V Dp + k±V Dp
¤
(16)
The second term on the right-hand side of (16) comes from the possibility
of obtaining a new patent. The deviator gets a new patent with probability
one if she innovates alone, with probability 1
2
if there is another innovator,
with probability 1
3
if there are two other innovators and so on. Inserting (15)
into (16) and solving for V Dp yields
V Dp =
¾®p¼
(1¡ ±)(1¡ ±®p¸) : (17)
Comparing (5) to (17) shows that from the innovators’ point of view collusion
and patenting are practically equivalent. Indeed, it makes little di¤erence to
a risk-neutral innovator whether she gets a share of 1
k+1
of monopoly pro…ts
for sure, or whether she gets the full monopoly pro…ts with probability 1
k+1
.
By (2), (3), and (15), (14) can be rewritten as
eVp = V + ®- (n) · ¼
1¡ ±®p¸ ¡
¼
(n+ 1) (1¡ ±®¸) ¡ ±
¡




As in (10), collusion can be sustained only if the term in the brackets is neg-
ative. The terms in the brackets in (10) and (18) suggest that the incentive
to deviate is larger under the patent system than without with. As earlier,
the …rst two terms in the brackets show the gain from the deviation in the
market where the deviation takes place. Without patents the deviator can
derive pro…ts only from the period of the deviation. In contrast, under the
patent system she is protected against punishment and receives payo¤s from
the subsequent periods, unless the innovation becomes public. The last term
in (18) shows that not only the patent protects against punishment in the
deviation market but also in the other markets in subsequent periods. It is
easy to establish the following …nding:
Proposition 2 If the patent system reduces spillovers (®p ¸ ®), collusion is
impossible in the patent system.
Proof. Collusion can be sustained only if V ¸ eVp, which can be rewritten
after the substitution of (5) and (17) into (18) as
n
n+ 1
(1¡ ±®¸) + (®p ¡ ®) ±¸
(n+ 1)
+ (®p ¡ ®) ±¾
1¡ ± · 0: (19)
The left-hand side of (19) is increasing in ®p. Evaluating it at ®p = ® shows
that it is zero when n = 0 and it is strictly positive for n ¸ 1.
The explanation for the …nding is straightforward. If the patent system
ful…lls its primary purpose and enhances the property rights over the in-
novation, it simultaneously protects against the punishment by the former
collusion members. The …rst two terms in (19) capture the bene…ts from the
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deviation in the market where it occurs. Even if we restrict the attention
to this single market, the protection a¤orded by the patent hinders collusive
behavior, as in the example of Section 2. But when the innovation is repeated
the protection against the punishment expands beyond the market where the
deviation originally occurred, because all innovators have an equal chance of
getting a patent over new innovations. The last term in (19) suggests that
the deviator even gets higher payo¤s in the future markets in the punishment
phase than under collusion, if the patent system reduces the spillovers. Thus
a strong patent protection eliminates possibilities for an e¢cient retaliation
both in the deviation market and in future markets, and collusion becomes
impossible.
Because collusion makes sense only if n ¸ 1, we can strengthen the above
result. As in the previous section, let us evaluate (19) at n = A¡1 when the
incentive to cheat is the highest. Let us denote the threshold level of patent
strength that makes (19) hold as an equality by b®p, i.e., if ®p ¸ b®p, collusion
is impossible under the patent system.
Proposition 3 For ®p 2 [b®p; ®] the patent system both increases the spillovers
and makes collusion impossible.
Proof. We need to prove that b®p < ®. Evaluating (19) at n = A¡1 and
solving for ®p such that it holds as an equality shows that b®p is given by
b®p = ® ¡ (1¡ ±) (A ¡ 1) (1¡ ±®¸)
± [¸ (1¡ ±) + ¾A] ;
which is clearly strictly smaller than ®:
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This is quite remarkable a result. Even if the patent system provides
weaker protection than secrecy, it can make collusion impossible. Moreover,
(19) suggests that for some ®p < b®p collusion remains possible but, by conti-




So far we have taken the viewpoint of antitrust authorities and focused on
the tension between competition and patent laws that prevails in the mar-
ket after the innovation is made. The viewpoint abstracts from the e¤ects of
patents on the incentive to innovate and consumer surplus, which are the key
issues in the literature on the patent policy. However, as shown by Fersht-
man and Pakes (2000), they should be equally important considerations for
competition policy, since whether an industry can or cannot sustain collusion
also a¤ects the incentives to innovate, which in turn a¤ects consumer surplus
and welfare in a dynamic context. Although the prior research has uncov-
ered several complex e¤ects of patents, the standard Nordhausian trade-o¤
provides a reasonable benchmark for welfare discussion.
Let us assume that the incentive to innovate is increasing and post-
innovation consumer surplus decreasing in ®p and ®. We focus on an in-
dustry where innovators collude without the patent system, which requires
large enough ± to make collusion feasible.7 Consider the e¤ects of introduc-
7If the innovators do not collude without patents, the situation will reduce to the
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ing the patent system into the industry. Assume …rst that the patent system
does not a¤ect the spillover rate, i.e., ®p = ®. By Proposition 2, collusive be-
havior is no longer feasible in the industry. But otherwise introducing patents
changes little: both under the patent system and collusion, the markets are
monopolized unless the underlying innovations become public. Because there
is no di¤erence in the spillover rate, the consumer surplus is identical in both
cases. Similarly, the incentives to innovate are identical, because risk-neutral
innovators do not care whether they get an equal share of monopoly prof-
its for sure or the full monopoly pro…ts with an equal probability. We can
therefore conclude that introducing patents into a collusive industry breaks
down collusion but leaves welfare unchanged, if it leaves the spillover rate
unchanged.
Assume then that policy-makers control the patent strength in the patent
system. At this juncture welfare discussion easily becomes convoluted be-
cause there can be too little or too much innovation in the competitive market
equilibrium, not to mention collusive environment. If the collusive industry
supports too little innovation, the policy-makers could enhance the incen-
tive to innovate by imposing a strong patent protection (®p > ®). This
would eliminate collusive behavior (Proposition 2), nonetheless reduce post-
innovation consumer surplus but increase the incentive to innovate. The
increase in innovative activity should create more new markets and foster
aggregate consumer surplus and welfare in a dynamic context. If there is
too much innovation under collusion, patent protection can be made weak
analysis of patent policy. We refer to our complementary work (Kultti, Takalo, and Toikka,
2005) for a characterization of optimal patent policy in a similar model of simultaneous
innovation without possibility to collude.
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(®p < ®) to weaken the incentive to innovate, spread information and ex-
pand post-innovation consumer surplus. From Proposition 3 we know that
for ®p 2 [b®p; ®] such a patent policy would also break down collusion and for
some ®p < b®p; it would make collusion more di¢cult.
In our case, however, it is immaterial whether boosting the incentive to
innovate or disseminating information is desirable from the welfare point of
view. Propositions 2-3 suggest that either goal can be achieved by intro-
ducing patents practically without concerns about collusion. Hence, we can
summarize the welfare discussion in the following result:
Remark 1 A welfare improvement can always be obtained by introducing a
patent system into a collusive industry
As to the optimal patent policy, it can be generally implemented without
making collusion easier. There is a theoretical possibility that the optimal
policy is so weak, i.e., the optimally set ®p approaches to zero, that it facili-
tates collusion. But in practice such a policy is hardly feasible, because the
innovators will resort to secrecy if the patent protection is very weak (Kultti,
Takalo, and Toikka, 2005).
6.2 Robustness and Future Work
Our main point to show that the patent system involves properties that can
break collusion. As we show, the result can be generalized to an arbitrary
number of innovators and ideas, spillovers, and the possibility of innovations
to become obsolete. There are, however, many important issues that lie out-
side the limited scope of this paper. Following the literature on semicollusion
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(Fershtman and Muller, 1986), we assume that innovators can only collude in
pricing, the reason being that collusive behavior in other dimensions, e.g., in
the search of ideas and patenting, requires coordination in a higher level. In
our model, collusion in innovation would mean that many agents contact the
same idea. In practice this could be achieved, e.g., by establishing a research
joint venture. In this case it would be natural to assume the research joint
venture partners can also coordinate their patenting decision and apply for
a joint patent once they come up with an idea.8 Drawing on Martin (1996)
we can speculate that such joint patenting facilitates collusion, compared
with the situation where no joint patents are allowed, because it expands
possibilities to retaliate in the market where deviation occurs. However, the
introduction of patents even with joint patenting possibility into an industry
where patenting was previously impossible would still increase the incen-
tives to deviate from collusion in so far at least one independent innovator
remains outside the joint patenting venture. In any case, if the venture part-
ners could not make an irreversible commitment to the joint venture, joint
patenting would have no impact on the punishment possibilities in other mar-
kets in subsequent periods. Hence, while the issue of joint patenting certainly
warrants more attention, especially by antitrust authorities, we think that it
would not change our main result that introducing patents limits the scope
for collusion.
For similar reasons, we can also ignore the possibility of cross-licensing
8Of course we could also think of joint patent applications being feasible without re-
search joint ventures. In this case the …rms would need to coordinate their patenting
after they come up an idea independently. This kind of coordination seems to be particu-
larly complex to implement and, hence, joint patenting without coordination of innovative
activities seems to be very unlikely.
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patents across markets. Like joint-patenting, cross-licensing in itself could
obviously raise antitrust concerns: Eswaran (1994) shows that cross-licensing
provides a means to establish a multimarket contact and from Bernheim and
Whinston (1990) we know the conditions where such a multimarket contact
is conducive to collusion. Nonetheless, we have two reasons to believe that
our main results would survive in the environment where the multimarket
contact via cross-licensing facilitated collusion. First, patents continue to
protect deviators against parties outside cross-licensing schemes. Second,
unless binding ex-ante licensing deals over undeveloped innovations are pos-
sible, our analysis would remain unchanged in the competition for future
markets.
We also assume high enough patent quality so that only one patent can
be awarded in case of multiple independent discoveries of the same idea. Al-
though this is a plausible point of departure, it is clearly restrictive: there are
often multiple patents associated with a single innovation in many industries.
Related research (Shapiro, 2001, Lerner and Tirole, 2004) suggests that an-
titrust problems could arise from patent pools where …rms collude by holding
partially overlapping or blocking patents. As in the case of joint patenting
and cross-licensing, patent pools or mutually blocking patents would expand
retaliation possibilities in the deviation market, because a deviator can be
taken to court over patent infringement. If innovation is repeated, the pre-
diction is more ambiguous, since the deviator can get non-blocking patents
in future innovation periods. Overall, it is still likely that allowing for patent
pools or blocking patents would leave our main results intact. Worth noting
is, however, that the analysis of patent pools would be somewhat awkward in
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our model. To investigate the antitrust problems arising from patent pools
would require more careful modelling of repeated innovation with overlap-
ping ideas and endogenous patent quality, where patents on the same idea
can sometimes be partial complements and sometimes partial substitutes.
In assessing the reliability of observations here, however, a caveat should
be kept in mind. Joint venture, cross-licensing and patent pool agreements
sometimes include clauses that, e.g., require partners to "grant back" their
new invention to the pool or to the other partners. Such clauses might be
anticompetitive because they could increase retaliation possibilities beyond
the market where deviation originally took place.
7 Conclusion
The traditional view regards the patent system as a necessary evil that is
needed to create the incentives to innovation by awarding an exclusive prop-
erty right over an innovation. Recently many have argued that it is an un-
necessary evil. Our argument can be interpreted that perhaps there is no evil
in the …rst place. We show that the patent system makes collusive behavior
more di¢cult and often impossible. Moreover, collusion can be impossible
even if the patent system provides weak protection and, thereby, promotes
information disclosure. It then follows that if innovative …rms collude when-
ever they can, social welfare is in general higher with a properly designed
patent policy than without it.
The …ndings are based on the two properties of the patent system. First,
patents almost by de…nition protect against retaliation by former collusion
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partners in the market where deviation takes place. Second, in innovative
industries where competition is dynamic, both deviators and other former
collusion partners have an equal chance of getting a patent on new innova-
tions in future markets, which also reduces the cost of retaliation.
Our analysis yields a number of testable implications. The …rst is that
collusion should be less frequent in innovative industries where spillovers are
high or innovations become obsolete rapidly. The second is that collusion
should be less frequent in industries where patents provide strong protection
or where propensity to patent is high. As a result, quiet patenting activity
in an innovative industry where patenting is feasible should be looked sus-
piciously from the antitrust point of view. The third hypothesis is subtler:
in principle, collusion should be less frequent in the …rst-to-…le patent sys-
tem. In the US, where the patent system is based on the …rst-to-invent rule,
deviation from collusion should be more costly. The problem with the hy-
pothesis is twofold. First, the …rst-to-invent rule sometimes allows patenting
by a later innovator if the …rst innovator has relied on secrecy. Second, in,
e.g., Europe and Japan the e¤ect of the …rst-to-…le is counterbalanced by the
prior-user rights. Like the …rst-to-invent rule, prior-user rights raise the cost
of retaliation in the market where deviation occurs.
Even if the testable prediction concerning the …rst-to-…le vs. the …rst-
to-invent rule is moot, some competition policy implications are clear. As
in Denicolò and Franzoni (2004), our analysis suggests that removing prior-
user rights could improve welfare since it should hamper collusion. Similarly,
the exception to the …rst-to-invent rule is justi…ed: allowing a later inno-
vator patent when the …rst innovator has kept the innovation secret should
27
make collusion more di¢cult. A bolder interpretation of our results supports
stronger patents and the expansion of patent subject matter in the sense that
they reduce the scope for collusion.
We believe that our analysis provides a useful …rst pass on the question
of whether the patent policy can be designed to prevent collusive behavior.
Our invariably a¢rmative answer is based on a number of strong assumptions
that should be relaxed in future research. Prior research (e.g., Eswaran, 1994,
Martin, 1996, Shapiro, 2001, 2003, and Lerner and Tirole, 2004) has identi…ed
a number of means such as cross-licensing, patent pools, patent settlements
and research joint ventures that enable …rms to use the patent system in an
anticompetitive manner. While such means can certainly facilitate collusion
in a world with patents and hence deserve closer scrutiny by researchers and
antitrust authorities alike, they do not seem to change our proposition that
antitrust authorities are better-o¤ in a world with patents than without them.
Nor are the incentives to innovate relevant for our main result. Indeed, that
we …nd patents involving bene…cial competition policy properties without
recourse to the incentives to innovate is noteworthy.
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